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Choices are often identity-based but the linkage to identity is not necessarily explicit or obvious for a number of reasons. First, identities feel
stable but are highly sensitive to situational cues. Second, identities include not only content but also readiness to act and to use procedures
congruent with the identity. Third, identities can be subtly cued without conscious awareness. Fourth, what an accessible identity means is
dynamically constructed in the particular context in which it is cued. Because identities carry action- and procedural-readiness, the outcome of an
identity-based motivation process may be similar to or different from the choices an individual would have made in another setting. Moreover,
once an identity is formed, action and procedural-readiness can be cued without conscious awareness or systematic processing, resulting in
beneficial or iatrogenic outcomes.
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Court elections case, has long been a top earning Wall Street
lawyer. But he does not appear in court elegantly attired in a
designer label suit; rather, he wears Lands' End suits, even
when arguing cases in front of the United States Supreme Court.
Why does he choose Lands' End, a Midwestern mail order
company famous for allowing returns or exchanges at any time
and for any reason—a policy called “Guaranteed. Period.”? As
he explains it, wearing Lands' End just feels right; it is the right
brand for him because he “comes from non-fancy people.” In
Lands' End suits he feels like himself, wearing them is
congruent with some aspect of his identity even if it might not
look that way to others. Like David Boies, people routinely
symbolize who they are and may become, as well as who they
are not and want to avoid becoming, through consumption
choices that can be self-symbolizing (Belk, 1988; Shavitt, 1990;
Shavit & Nelson, 1999).
In this paper I focus on a perhaps less obvious aspect of these
choices, which is that they are rooted in identity-based
motivation. Identity-based motivation is the readiness to engage
in identity-congruent action (Oyserman, 2007; Oyserman,
Brickman, Bybee, & Celious, 2006; Oyserman, Fryberg, &
Yoder, 2007) and to use identity-congruent mindsets in makingE-mail address: daphna.oyserman@umich.edu.
1057-7408/$ - see front matter © 2009 Society for Consumer Psychology. Publish
doi:10.1016/j.jcps.2009.05.008sense of the world (Oyserman, Sorensen, Reber, Chen, &
Sannum, in press). Although often experienced as stable,
identity is highly malleable and situation-sensitive so that which
aspect of identity comes to mind is a dynamic product of that
which is chronically accessible and that which is situationally
cued. Moreover, because what is cued is a general mindset
rather than a specific content list, identity's impact on action-
and procedural-readiness is likely to occur outside of conscious
awareness and without systematic processing. I provide
evidence that this is indeed the case; like David Boies whose
frugal Midwestern self felt uncomfortable in a more expensive
suit, people's choices are identity-based, resulting in choices
that may not benefit them and may even undermine their well-
being if these choices do not feel congruent with the press to act
in identity-congruent ways.
To preview, in the next sections I outline what is meant by
identity and identity-based motivation using a situated cogni-
tion framework. I then give examples of how identity-based
motivation influences action and cognitive procedures. Speci-
fically, I show how action-readiness influences consumers'
choices in the domains of health and consumption and students'
choices in the domain of academic performance. Turning to
how identity-based motivation influences cognitive procedures,
I review studies that show that temporary contextual influences
can mirror chronic cultural differences in cognitive processing.
Finally, I return to consumer research and address how aned by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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consumer choice.
Identity and motivation
What is meant by identity?
Identity and self-concept are often used as interchangeable
terms, though the self-concept may be better described as a
theory about who one was, is, and may become articulated via
an array of personal and social identities (Howard, 2000;
Oyserman, 2001). Prior models assumed that identities form a
clearly organized, stable or integrated hierarchical system, but
evidence for this stability is scanty. Current conceptualizations
are rooted in social cognition research and emerging knowledge
about biological systems and assume a not-well-integrated array
of personal and social identities. Personal identities (e.g., being
a rugged individual, being smart) focus on traits, characteristics
and goals that are not formulated as connected to membership in
a social group or relationship. In that sense they are
decontextualized descriptions of personal traits, characteristics
and goals. In contrast, social identities (e.g., being a
Midwesterner, being a member of Gen Y) are contextualized;
they include the traits, characteristics and goals linked to a
social role or social group that the person was, is, or may
become a member of. Social identities range from broad,
temporally expansive core identities (e.g., gender, cultural,
racial-ethnic or religious heritage) to narrow, temporally
specific identities (e.g., ‘a 4th grader’). Social identities may
function integratively (e.g., a Midwestern woman, a Black
male) or separately (e.g., a woman, a Midwesterner), depending
on what is relevant in a particular context. As part of the self-
concept, identities organize experience and present a basis for
making predictions about oneself and about others' response to
the self. When nothing looks right for the shopper trying on
clothes in the store, a salient ‘out of shape’ identity makes for a
different understanding than a salient ‘academic’ identity. The
out-of-shape shopper may buy exercise gear and vow to return
with a new trim figure; the academic shopper may decide that
the whole shopping thing is not worthwhile, get back into his
clothes and return to the office to write a paper.
While often described in the present tense, identities are
temporal, describing the person one was, is, and may become
(Neisser, 1988; Oyserman & James, 2008; Ross & Wilson,
2002). While often assessed as semantic content, identities are
experienced across sensory modes, including embodied experi-
ence of the self as a physical entity; they further include
procedural knowledge and goals (Csordas, 1994; Markus &
Oyserman, 1989; Oyserman, 2001). Though anything seen as
identity-relevant is more likely to be positively than negatively
valenced, identities include negative as well as positive
possibilities, undesired as well as desired futures.
Though all self-concepts are assumed to contain both social
and personal identities, people differ in the likelihood that
personal or social identities are central as well as the ways in
which identities are conceptualized. Gender, culture, and
minority status all might make particular social identities orintersections between identities (e.g. Black professional male)
salient and can increase or decrease the tendency to use social
vs. personal identities to make sense of the self generally
(Brewer, 1991; Cole, 2009; Cross & Madson, 1997; Fiske,
Kitayama, Markus, & Nisbett, 1998; Markus & Oyserman,
1989). Within cultural psychology, the terms individual and
collective or independent and interdependent are used to
describe individuals who are more likely to use personal vs.
social identities as well as to describe societies that are more
likely to institutionalize or prioritize personal vs. social
identities (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1989).
Cultural psychological formulations propose stable between-
group and between-society differences in the propensity to define
the self (and the social world) in terms of groups and
embeddedness within groups as well as stable differences in the
kinds of groups that are self-defining (e.g., friendship, family,
religious, tribal) (Fiske et al., 1998; Oyserman, 1993; Triandis,
1995). These differences are assumed to be based in history,
socialization and social institutions so data are typically collected
by comparing groups. However, evidence from such between-
group or between-society comparisons suffer from causal
ambiguity—groups and societies differ on many characteristics
and it remains unclear whether observed differences are due to the
posited cause or one of its numerous natural confounds. Hence,
any observed difference could be due to differences in history or
institutions as well as to more proximate factors that differ in the
immediate context. While many of the theoretically posited
between-society differences assumed based in individualism and
collectivism can be found, between-society comparisons cannot
illuminate the underlying process (for meta-analytic reviews and
a discussion of the methodological issues, see Oyserman, Coon,
& Kemmelmeier, 2002; Oyserman & Lee, 2008). However,
experimental approaches can provide insight into the underlying
causal processes. Using priming techniques, recent experimental
research indicates that cross-cultural differences can be repro-
duced within a given society through priming procedures. These
results suggest that the differences observed between societies
may be better conceptualized as differences in the relative
salience of social and personal identities, not as differences in the
existence of these identities (Oyserman & Lee, 2008). Both
personal and social identities are easily cued, suggesting that
societies may differ in two ways. First, as posited by theories of
individualism and collectivism (e.g., Triandis, 1989), societies
are likely to differ in the propensity for any particular situation to
cue a social identity, as compared to a personal identity. Second,
as outlined in the section on situated cognition, societies may also
differ in which particular personal or social identities are cued,
and what these identities mean in context.
Which identities matter?
Some identities are more likely to be situationally cued than
others. Broader identities (e.g., female) are more likely to be
cued than narrower ones (e.g., professor). Gender and race-
ethnicity are both broad and also often psychologically salient
(for a developmental argument as to why that is the case, see
Bigler & Liben, 2006). In addition to gender and race-ethnicity,
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in context (McGuire, McGuire, Child, & Fujiota, 1979).
McGuire et al. demonstrated that ethnicity was more likely to
be salient when it was distinctive. Distinctiveness is of course
highly situational. For example, in the context of jury duty,
being a social sciences professor may be highly meaningful
distinction, hair color not. Being a graduate student may be
salient to identity in some contexts (e.g., meetings with one's
advisor) but not others (e.g., carpooling children to school).
However, numerous other variables—from situational charac-
teristics to experimental primes—can render an identity salient
and increase its temporary relevance and influence.
Identity-based motivation
Identity-based motivation is a theoretical model that focuses
attention on the motivational pull toward identity-congruent
action and identity-congruent cognitive procedures. It builds on
prior theories about self-concept and identity (for a review, see
Oyserman, 2007) and links them to modern motivation theories,
utilizing a situated social cognition perspective (e.g., Schwarz,
2007, 2009; Smith & Semin, 2004, 2007). A situated
perspective proposes that cognition and action are not separate
from contexts but rather are dynamically shaped by them.
Identity-based motivation moves beyond purely cognitive
models by integrating the perspective with modern goal theories
which propose that once instantiated, goals can be situationally
cued outside of conscious awareness and without systematic
processing (for a review, Fischbach & Fergeson, 2007).
From an identity-based motivation perspective, both perso-
nal and social identities matter. While identity and social
identity-based theories often focus on the social groups that
people claim membership in and their valenced feelings about
membership (Hogg, Terry, & White, 1995), the identity-based
motivation model argues that social identities include more than
simple knowledge of group membership or positive sense of in-
group connection. Specifically, the identity-based motivation
model expands operationalization of identities from two
components to three, from operationalization based in member-
ships and beliefs, to an expanded operationalization that
includes readiness articulated as action-readiness and proce-
dural-readiness.
First, consider social identities. The membership component
of a social identity is about membership—the knowledge that
one is or may become a member of a particular group. The
beliefs component of a social identity focuses on beliefs about
the group's place in the world and how the group engages the
world. This includes beliefs about how permeable group
boundaries are, how much being a member of that group
carries with it permanent (essentialized) or impermanent
characteristics, how the groups one is a member of fit into
broader society, and how members of these groups act, what
they believe in, what their goals and values are, and the
strategies they use to attain these goals. The readiness
component of a social identity includes action- and proce-
dural-readiness, readiness to act in ways that are congruent
with beliefs about group membership and to make sense of theworld using relevant cognitive procedures. Action-readiness
involves self-controlling, self-regulating behaviors and embo-
died stances—how one stands, moves, dresses, and talks.
Procedural-readiness involves sense-making about the social
and non-social world, with social and personal identities differing
in whether an individual or collective mindset is cued and so
whether separating or connecting procedures are activated.
Next, consider personal identities. Like social identities,
personal identities include three basic components (member-
ship, beliefs, and readiness). Personal identity memberships
focus on being or becoming the type of person who has the
desired identity, or avoiding becoming the type of person who
has the undesired identity. Personal identity beliefs focus on the
norms, values, goals and strategies believed to exemplify
desired and undesired identities. Action-readiness involves
readiness to take action congruent with attaining desired
identity goals and avoiding undesired identities. Procedural-
readiness involves readiness to make sense of the world using
an identity-congruent mindset.
Identity-based motivation is socially situated cognition
The premise of an identity-based motivation perspective is
that people use identities to prepare for action and to make sense
of the world around them. That is, that thinking (about identity)
is for doing, an insight that can be dated back at least to James
William (1890/1983). More recent key formulations of this
theme come from Smith and Semin's situated social cognition
model (2004, 2007), Fiske's (1992) thinking-is-for-doing
formulation of the situatedness of social cognition, and
Schwarz's (2007, in press) situational sensitivity formulation
of social judgment. While varied, each of these formulations
highlights the constructive nature of cognition and underscores
that individuals are sensitive to meaningful features of the
environment and adjust thinking and doing to what is
contextually relevant (Fiske, 1992).
In this way, the identity-based motivation model builds on
the recurrent social psychological theme that cognition is
situated and pragmatic. Situated and social perspectives call
attention to the fact that contexts in which one thinks influence
both what comes to mind and how one makes sense of what
comes to mind. Thinking is contextualized by social and non-
social features of contexts, including the pragmatics of the task
at hand and one's physical experiences in the context (Smith &
Semin, 2004).
Taken together, situated cognition approaches suggest a few
basic premises: 1) people think in order to engage in adaptive
action; 2) thinking is situated; and 3) the impact of contexts on
thinking does not depend on conscious awareness of its impact.
Thinking is influenced by the context in which it occurs,
including physical and social features of the external context as
well as the experience of thinking itself. This means that
thinking is not invariant and context-free; people think flexibly
and are responsive to the immediate environment. The context
sensitivity highlighted by situated approaches does not depend
on conscious awareness of the impact of psychologically
meaningful features of situations on cognition. Not only do
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attention to the potential influence of context can change the
response (e.g., Fiske, 1992; Schwarz, in press).
To be sure, situated and social cognition approaches do not
propose that all context effects on cognitive processes are
necessarily mediated by self-concept or identity (e.g., Smith &
Semin, 2004). However, a situated framework is critical to
understanding identity-based motivation. The identity-based
motivation model proposes that people are motivated to act in
ways and make sense of the world using procedures congruent
with their identities. But identities are situated. Which identities
come to mind and what they mean in context is a function of
both chronic and situational cues, with some situations more
likely to cue particular identities or constellations of identities
than others. People's interpretation of cued identities (or
identity constellations) depends on the pragmatic meaning of
these identities in the particular context; action- and procedural-
readiness will be cued but also shaped by the affordances of
the context.
When situations cue an identity (e.g., female) what the cued
identity carries with it is not a fixed list of traits (e.g., warm,
energetic). Rather, the cued identity carries with it a general
readiness to act and make sense of the world in identity-
congruent terms, including the norms, values, strategies and
goals associated with that identity as well as the cognitive
procedures relevant to it. What exactly this readiness looks like
is dependent on what the cued identity comes to mean in the
particular context in which it is cued. Being female is likely to
mean something different in a sexually harassing job interview
when a bfemale job seeker" identity is salient than on a date or at
the hairdresser, when other aspects of being female are salient.
This does not imply that identities do not predict behaviors over
time but rather that the predictive power of an identity depends
on the stability of the contexts in which it is cued because
differing contexts cue different aspects of an identity and
differing intersections with other identities. The effect of an
identity will be stable over time to the extent that individuals
repeatedly encounter psychologically isomorphic situations
because in each instance the situation will engender readiness
to take the same actions (for a related discussion of the stability
of attitudes see Schwarz, 2007).
The impact of context on action-readiness is demonstrated in
a study of responses to a sexually harassing job interview
comparing in vivo contextualized behavior to predicted
(decontextualized) behavior (Woodzicka & LaFrance, 2002).
In the contextualized version, adult women were recruited for a
job interview. They were interviewed by a male interviewer
who asked sexually harassing inappropriate questions such as
‘Do you think it is important for women to wear bras to work?’
and ‘Do you have a boyfriend?’. In the decontextualized
version, a separate sample of adult women read about an
interview which included the same set of sexually harassing
inappropriate questions, but did not participate in an actual
interview.
Thus, both sets of women had their identity as female cued,
but for one set of women, identity was decontextualized from
the immediate context while for the other set of women, identitywas contextualized. The decontextualized identity group all said
that they would not stand for being treated that way as women,
that they would be angry, confront the harasser and terminate
such an interview. This was not the case for the contextualized
identity group. None of these women terminated the interview
or confronted the harasser; they smiled appeasingly and
responded to all the questions. After the interview, almost
none of these women reported anger, some reported fear.
Thus, while outside of context, female identity implied
readiness to take assertive action including leaving the
interview; in the job-seeking context, the aspects of female
identity that were salient cued a different action set. These
women did not leave the interview; they smiled and answered
even inappropriate questions. What the interview situation cued
was their socially appropriate job-seeking female identity and
they acted to appease authority, to not appear rude and to get the
job. Features of contexts influence which identities are likely to
be salient, what these identities mean, and how action-readiness
is directed, all without being explicitly articulated. When
contexts are not psychologically equivalent (e.g., reading about
an interview vs. being in an interview) they are unlikely to cue
the same identity content, procedures and goals.
Just as in the above example, in everyday life, identity-based
motivation is common. It is cued when an identity is cued by
psychologically meaningful features of everyday situations, the
features which tell the participant what the situation is about.
Because thinking is for doing and is a dynamic product of the
constraints and affordances of the immediate context, the
particular identity cued in a particular context is a function of
what is psychologically meaningful in context, what is
chronically salient or central to the individual, and what the
situational action-potentials are. While identities feel stable,
they are better conceptualized as dynamically created and
recreated in each situation in which they are evoked. Because
thinking is for doing and thinking is the emergent outcome of a
dynamic process, contextual cues determine, at least in part, not
only whether a particular identity will be cued but also how a
cued identity will be interpreted and therefore which proce-
dures, behaviors, choices and motivations are primed. Even
though they emerge in a dynamic interaction with context, cued
identities are consequential for subsequent meaning making,
including which cognitive procedures are brought to bear and
which actions are taken.
Consequences of identity-based motivation
In this section, I present evidence that identity-based
motivation results in readiness to take action even when the
action is not beneficial to the participant or is unlikely to have
been chosen outside of the specific context. Thinking about
identity-based motivation and action-readiness focuses atten-
tion on choices made because of feelings of identity-fit, things
people do or avoid doing because of fit or mis-fit with impor-
tant identities. Once a choice becomes identity-linked, it is
automatized. If it feels identity-syntonic, it feels right and does
not require further reflection. On the other hand, if it feels non-
syntonic to identity, it feels wrong and this feeling also does not
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behaviors that fit other motivational states feel right and are
therefore, potentiated (Higgins, 2000, 2007; Higgins & Scholer,
2009).
As the following studies illustrate, one important variable
triggering identity-based motivation is whether the situation
brings identity to mind. Situations can bring identities to mind
in different ways, ranging from explicit priming to the identity's
distinctiveness in situ and concerns that the identity may not be
validated in the context.
Identity-based motivation and action-readiness: consumption,
health behaviors and academic performance
Consumption choices
Participants prefer brands associated with their self-schemas,
but only if they are reminded of them in the context of the study
(Aaker, 1999). Because identity-based motivation triggers
action-readiness, there is no need for the target product to
have a prior content-based link to the identity. For example,
Latinos have been found to prefer detergents associated with a
same ethnicity spokesperson—but only if they are minorities in
their town, not otherwise (Deshpande and Stayman, 1994;
Forehand & Deshpande, 2001). Presumably, their minority
status in the local environment made racial-ethnic identity
chronically salient, advantaging communications from a same
ethnicity spokesperson. Because it is unlikely that racial-ethnic
identity has an a priori connection with laundry detergent, such
effects can best be understood in terms of situational
affordances. When racial-ethnic identity is chronically on the
participants' minds and linked to the current product through a
same race-ethnicity spokesperson, it imbues the product with
identity relevance and facilitates consumption.
Health behaviors
Identity-based motivation matters for consequential health-
related choices. In a series of studies we (Oyserman et al., 2007,
Studies 1 and 2) demonstrated that minority and majority
groups held the same baseline beliefs about the efficacy of a
healthy lifestyle in reducing health risks. Nevertheless, minority
group members were more likely to identify unhealthy
behaviors like eating fried foods, drinking soda and adding
salt as in-group behaviors and less likely to identify healthy
behaviors like flossing teeth or exercising as an adult as in-
group defining. These differences were striking because
participants were college students at an elite private university.
More important, their perceptions of what is or is not an in-
group thing to do made their correct baseline beliefs about the
efficacy of a healthy lifestyle vulnerable to identity-based
motivational concerns.
When we primed minority (e.g., Latino, African American,
or American Indian) and low-income identities, participants'
access to information about health and belief in the preventive
capacity of health behaviors was undermined. In this case, low
income, Latino and African American children reported higher
fatalism about their future health as adults (Oyserman et al.,
2007, Study 3). Effects were robust across samples and ages. Ina related study, we primed middle school children to think of
their racial-ethnicity and social class and then asked questions
about health behaviors. They were less successful in accessing
their health knowledge, making more mistakes on a health
knowledge quiz than when these identities were not primed
(Oyserman et al., 2007, Study 4). Moreover, when race-
ethnicity was made salient, African American and Native
American college students and adult participants rated smoking,
weight gain, and high sugar consumption as less likely to
negatively influence health than when race-ethnicity was not
salient (Oyserman et al., 2007, Studies 5–7).
However salient identity does not always undermine healthy
responses. We found that the negative effect of accessible racial-
ethnic identity on health beliefs is dependent on content of
racial-ethnic identity. Identity priming does not undermine
health beliefs among participants who do not see unhealthy
lifestyle behaviors as social identity-congruent.
In sum, healthy behaviors that are not seen as the kind of
thing “we” do are unlikely to be chosen, even if the overall goal
of maintaining health is endorsed. Like David Boise who felt
uncomfortable in a more expensive designer label suit,
participants in these studies would be unlikely to floss, not
because they do not believe it would work for others, but
because using floss is not congruent with important social
identities (Oyserman et al., 2007).
A number of other studies focusing on health behaviors
found similar outcomes. To successfully engage individuals
who do not see themselves as middle class whites in exercise, it
is important to frame activities in ways that highlight the in-
group congruence of action. It helps, for example, to use
everyday clothing and dance as the medium and to avoid asking
people to don spandex and jog (Choudhry, 1992; Cooper, Hill,
& Powe, 2002). Similarly, when being or becoming physically
attractive is identity-congruent and feels attainable, exercise
appeals are more effective in producing behavior change
(Martin & Leary, 2001; Werch, 2007). When low or no alcohol
use is coupled with valued possible selves and social identities,
alcohol use among at risk youth declines at three-month follow-
up (Werch, Moore, DiClemente, Owen, Jobli, & Bledsoe 2003),
as does alcohol and marijuana use among college students
(Werch et al., 2008). The reverse pathway has also been shown.
In a study explicitly manipulating the identity-congruence of
alcohol consumption, undergraduate students reported less
alcohol consumption when they learned that graduate students,
a dis-valued out-group, drank a lot (Berger & Rand, 2008).
Academic performance
Identity matters for academic outcomes (Steele, 1997).
When a social identity is made salient, performance declines if
the social group associated with the identity is stereotyped as
not performing well academically and improves if the social
group associated with the identity is stereotyped as doing well
(Shih, Pittinsky, & Ambady, 1999; for a review, Wheeler &
Petty, 2001). An identity-based motivation perspective focuses
attention on the processes underlying these effects. For
example, in some situations, identities feel safely supported
and accepted by others. In other situations, the legitimacy of
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which an identity is questioned cue identity-based motivation to
demonstrate identity-fit.
For example, we observed among minority youth that acting
like an in-group member is particularly important when
concerns about fitting in are salient. Specifically, we compared
feelings of social acceptance, classroom behavior, and grades of
racial-ethnic minority students who did or did not look
prototypically like members of their racial-ethnic group
(Oyserman et al., 2006, Studies 1, 2). Because the classroom
context does not afford many ways to engage in identity-
relevant action, we predicted and found that students whose
identities were challenged by not looking prototypical would
feel less accepted and would be more likely to engage in
academic stereotype-confirming behaviors, like disengaging
from classroom participation and attaining worse grades.
In one set of studies, we examined the effect of non-
prototypical physical appearance on engagement in academic
stereotype-confirming behaviors in a sample of African
American and Latino low income inner city youths (Oyserman
et al., 2006, Studies 1 and 2). We obtained school records of
grades for a community sample of African American youths
who were asked to rate how much they fit in socially and how
engaged they were with school. They also provided a physical
description that included their hair, eye and skin tone on color
continuums. We asked a separate group of African American
respondents from the same community to use this same
continuum to mark boundaries for light, medium and dark
skin tone. Poorer grades, low felt social acceptance and low
engagement with school were predicted by being non-proto-
typical, that is having light skin tone in a context in which this
was uncommon.
Effects were then conceptually replicated for Latino youth.
Teacher-rated behavior problems and school-recorded grade
point average were predicted by whether youth reported looking
like a prototypical group member. This main effect was
mediated by friendship choices. Students who believed that
they did not look Latino were more likely to choose friends who
were not engaged with school, and this friendship choice
influenced student in-class behavior and grades.
In sum, youth who did not look like in-group members were
more likely to enact an in-group identity by engaging in
stereotype-consistent academic behavior; they under-performed
academically, misbehaved in class and chose non-school
focused friendships. These results suggest that identity-based
motivation can have negative effects when the options for
identify-confirming action are limited to dysfunctional beha-
viors. When belongingness to an important group is threatened,
people use the situationally available means to mark their
identities even when this means poor performance and adverse
personal outcomes.
However, an identity-based perspective does not suggest
simply that people are prone to self-stereotype. Rather, it
holds that identities influence behavior by providing informa-
tion about group norms and expectations and by shaping a
person's interpretation of social and contextual feedback
(Oyserman, 2007). Hence, identity-based motivation can haveboth positive (stereotype-disconfirming) and negative (stereo-
type-confirming) impacts on behavior.
For example, in one study, we had students complete a math
task before or after being reminded of their racial or ethnic group
membership (Oyserman, Kemmelmeier, Fryberg, Brosh, &
Hart-Johnson, 2003, Studies 1 and 2). Being reminded of group
membership improved or undermined math performance
depending on content of racial-ethnic identity. Performance
improved for students with ‘dual’ identities who saw themselves
as members of both their racial-ethnic in-group and broader
society. In contrast, performance declined for students with ‘in-
group only’ identities who saw themselves only as members of
their racial-ethnic in-group and not of broader society. We found
the same pattern of effects in a separate sample of youths who
were followed over the course of the school year. Here, identity
beliefs predicted grade point average over time. Controlling for
prior school performance, ‘dual’ racial-ethnic identities pre-
dicted improved performance compared to ‘in-group only’
identities (Oyserman et al., 2003, Study 3).
The same pattern of effects was found in a sample of youth
followed for 4 years from ninth to twelfth grade. ‘Dual’
identities predicted improved performance compared to ‘in-
group only’ identities, presumably because doing well in school
was seen as an identity-relevant goal for the former but not the
latter students (Oyserman, 2008). To directly test this effect, we
reminded students of their racial-ethnic identity either before or
after taking a math test. When reminded of their racial-ethnic
identity, African American students persisted more at math
tasks if they believed that doing well in school was part of
racial-ethnic identity (Oyserman, Gant, & Ager, 1995, Study 2).
Summary
Taken together these studies underscore a few basic points.
First, people are motivated to act in identity-congruent ways.
Second, what an identity means in context is a dynamic function
of the pragmatic options for action in a particular situation and
how these options are imbued with identity-based meaning.
Third, the action-readiness aspect of identity-based motivation
does not necessarily serve individuals' own goal attainment.
Unlike rational choice formulations, the identity-based motiva-
tion model does not imply that values are different or that
actions necessarily are congruent with a set of underlying
values. Note that if given a decontextualized choice, individuals
are unlikely to choose to attain poor grades or to be unhealthy.
However, in context, choices differed because actions leading to
these outcomes were imbued with identity-based meaning.
These observations have important implications for consumer
behavior, which I address in a later section. Next, I turn to the
effects of identity-based motivation on cognitive mindsets—
how meaning is made.
Identity-based motivation and procedural-readiness:
Basic cognitive performance and problem solving
In this section, the following proposition is considered: when
a specific personal or social identity is cued in context, what is
cued is not simply content but also a way of thinking, a
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relational and connected information-processing generally—a
focus on patterns, connections and relationships. Conversely,
having an autonomous and separated sense of self cues a
different information-processing style, in this case separating
and pulling procedures are cued and the focus is on figure, main
point and central aspects.
Thus, two basic procedures are considered, which we term
‘pulling apart and separating’ procedures and ‘connecting and
relating’ procedures. The idea is that what comes to mind when
an identity is cued is not simply content but also a general way
of making sense of the world. Because personal identities focus
attention on traits and characteristics separate from relation-
ships, the procedure cued would be to ignore background and
details and focus only on a main point. Because social identities
focus attention on relationships, with traits and characteristics
having meaning only within the context of relationships, the
procedure cued would be to pay attention to background and
details and focus on connection.
This proposition builds on earlier formulations of gender,
race-ethnicity, and cultural differences in the propensity to
define the self as a set of personal identities separated from
contexts, relationships, and group memberships or as a set of
social identities, embedded in contexts, relationships and group
memberships (Markus & Oyserman, 1989; Triandis, 1989;
Woike, 1994). These formulations held in common the
assumption that how one thinks about the self should influence
how one thinks generally. For example, Markus and Oyserman
(1989) carefully reviewed the extant literature on gender
differences in mathematical and spatial abilities, arguing that
while many differences were due to differences in training and
exposure, a smaller subset seemed due to something else.
They found that on average men and women reported
navigating three-dimensional spaces differently, with men more
likely to report mental imagery separated from their own
perspective—seeing the world ‘as the crow flies’ rather than as
they traversed it. Tasks that involved rotation of objects in three-
dimensional space also showed this gender difference. Markus
and Oyserman (1989) proposed that basic differences in how
the self is organized could predict these differences. Even
though both men and women may have social identities based in
gender, men and women may differ in the propensity to use
social and relational information. Men are more likely to define
the self as separated from, and women more likely to define the
self as embedded in, contexts and relationships. These
differences in content should also have implications for which
cognitive procedures are accessible when the self was salient.
Whereas Markus and Oyserman's (1989) argument was
based on a review of the gender literature on cognitive style,
subsequent focus shifted to cross-national differences arguing
for cultural differences in personal vs. social focus of self-
concept (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). At the same time, cross-
national differences in judgment and decision making were also
emerging that seemed to parallel these differences in self-
concept focus (for a review, see Oyserman et al., 2002). Just as
personal identities focus on the self as separate, Americans seem
to focus on the figure and ignore background in processingvisual information generally, while Chinese (Nisbett, 2003) and
Japanese (Kitayama, Duffy, Kawamura, & Larsen, 2003) seem
to focus on the relationship between figure and background,
congruent with a social identity focus on the self as connected
and related.
While intriguing, simply showing between-country differ-
ences in average cognitive style does not yet clarify the process
underlying these differences. Effects may be due to the
postulated cultural differences, to other culture-related factors,
or to other differences entirely (see Oyserman & Lee, 2008, for
a discussion). Thus, between-country comparisons cannot
provide causal evidence that cognitive style is cued by salient
personal and social identities. A first step in this process is to
demonstrate that subtle situational cues do shift self-concept
focus; a second step is to link these to the kinds of differences in
procedures found in East–West comparisons.
An initial demonstration that average between-society
differences in self-concept focus could be the result of
situational cues was provided by Triandis and his colleagues
(Triandis, 1989; Trafimow, Triandis, & Goto, 1991). They
demonstrated that they could reliably predict whether people
would use more personal or social identities to describe
themselves by shifting their in-the-moment focus on themselves
as similar to or different from friends and family. They also
showed that once a personal or social identity focus was cued in
one situation, it was likely to be used again in another situation.
They proposed that cross-national differences in self-concept
focus were due to situational cues. In the past 20 years, this
basic finding has been replicated using a variety of situational
cues, showing that people in East and West describe themselves
using more or fewer social identities, depending on which is
cued in situation (for a review, Oyserman & Lee, 2008). Taken
together, the evidence is clear that situational cues influence
whether a social or personal identity is cued.
In a series of experiments, we demonstrated that the same
kinds of situational cues that make salient social vs. personal
identities also trigger the cognitive procedures that parallel cross-
national differences in whether a focal target or integrated whole
is first perceived.We showed that the performance of participants
from a variety of racial-ethnic and national groups (including
African Americans, Asian Americans, European Americans,
Koreans, Hong Kong Chinese, and Norwegians) was system-
atically influenced by whether an individual or a collective
mindset was cued (Oyserman et al., in press). To prime
mindset, participants were asked to read a paragraph and to
mark the pronouns. To prime an individual mindset, the
pronouns were first person singular (I, me, my); to prime a
collectivemindset, the pronounswere first person plural (we, our,
us). Participants then completed a dichotic listening task that
required them to repeat nonsense syllables presented to one ear
and to ignore nonsense syllables presented to the other ear
(Studies 6 and 7). Other participants completed a Stroop task that
required them to name the color of the ink (e.g., blue) in which a
color word (e.g., ‘red’) was printed, ignoring the semantic
meaning of the word (Studies 4 and 5). When primed with an
individual mindset, participants were better at these types of
tasks, presumably because the mindset was congruent with the
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focusing on some information while ignoring other information.
Conversely, when primed with a collective mindset, participants
were better at incidental recall of details including those that
they had been explicitly told to ignore (Studies 1–3). Taken
together, these studies indicate that individual and collective
mindsets are associated with different cognitive procedures and
facilitate their application. Specifically, an individual mindset is
associated with procedures that facilitate focus on an isolated
stimulus and its unique attributes, pulling the stimulus apart
from the field. In contrast, a collective mindset is associated
with procedures that facilitate the identification of relationships,
emphasizing the embeddedness of a stimulus in its field. Each
of these procedures facilitates performance on some tasks, and
impairs performance on others.
Importantly, we observed that subtle situational influences
can cue collective and individual mindsets in both East Asian
societies described as collective and in Western societies
described as individualistic. Our results are therefore not
compatible with an argument that differences in cognitive
procedures are based in extensive socialization in the
intellectual traditions of a culture (Nisbett, 2003). Rather, our
results suggest that differences in the spontaneous application of
cognitive procedures are better portrayed as efficient responses
to culturally dominant tasks, consistent with theories of situated
cognition (see Oyserman & Lee, 2007, Oyserman & Sorensen,
2009 for more detailed discussion). While these effects are not
necessarily mediated by a shift in focus from social to personal
identity, an identity-based motivation model implies that when a
social or personal identity is cued, it carries with it procedural-
readiness, readiness to make sense of the world using an
individual or collective mindset.
Implications of identity-based motivation for
consumer behavior
The identity-based motivation model suggests two things
relevant for consumer psychology. First, identity-congruent
choices are more likely than identity-incongruent choices, no
matter if these choices are perceived as beneficial or not.
Second, identity-congruence and identity-incongruence can be
construed as focused on the similarity between the choice and
in-group ‘me’ identities or between the choice and out-group
‘not me’ identities.
The idea that products and brands are identity-linked has a
long history in consumer psychology. Beyond price, quality and
functionality, people use products as ways to identify who they
are, especially if the product can be associated with a
prototypical user, can be linked to one's own identity, and has
attributes or a ‘personality’ that is congruent with valued current
or future identities (Belk, 1988; Sirgy, 1982). Consumption
choices are also used by others to make identity inferences (e.g.,
Belk, 1988; Ferraro, Kirmani, & Matherly, 2009; Kleine,
Kleine, & Kernan, 1993). People prefer choices that signal
connection to important in-groups and avoid connection with
important out-groups (Akers, 1968; Berger & Health, 2007).
These features of products are especially important for productsperceived as having expressive rather than only utilitarian
qualities (Shavitt, 1990; Shavit & Nelson, 1999).
The identity-based motivation model clarifies that this is a
bi-directional relationship. Products that allow for identity
expression should be valued for two reasons. First, they cue
identity-based motivation, meaning that choice will be imbued
with more meaning; it will feel expressive rather than only
utilitarian. Second, if a consumption choice is perceived to be
identity-congruent, the choice should feel more important. This
means that products associated with identity-based concerns are
more likely to have a loyal consumer base.
Association can be framed through product qualities as well
as the terminology used to position the brand. For example, in
their print catalogue and on-line portal, Lands' End explicitly
uses the term modesty to highlight features of its women's wear
and swimwear, such as swim skirts and extra cloth to cover and
mask cleavage. Though the target audience may be all women,
the salient use of modesty as a descriptor suggests that the
prototypical user is modest. Modesty is an identity-syntonic
goal for women with particular socio-cultural and religious
identities. If Lands' End is known as the modest choice, then
choosing Lands' End is a way to reinforce relevant social
identities. Note it is both that the clothing choices are modest
and that they are marketed as such that matters—facilitating the
spread of the idea that the choice is identity-syntonic within an
in-group. Thus, the identity-based motivation approach clarifies
that consumers actively search among consumption choices for
choices that fit important identities, and simultaneously do not
fit out-group identities. Brands and products seeking to
capitalize on this tendency must accept the likelihood that the
features that attract one group may also be the features that
reduce attraction for another group.
These associations with products and specific brands have
been termed the equity (Aaker, 1991) or personality of the brand
(Aaker, 1997). Brand equity focuses on a broad array of
characteristics relevant to a brand, which may include fit with
one's own current or possible future identity. However, the
identity-based motivation model clarifies that when brands or
products are identity-congruent they are preferred. This
preference is independent of any evaluative judgment about
the brand or product—once a product is identity-congruent, it
becomes what ‘we’ use, separate from utilitarian concerns. Just
as one's in-group may have negative attributes or make poor
choices, but these choices and attributes are still in-group
defining, products and brands can be identity-congruent even if
the product or brand is also negatively evaluated.
Take, for example, cigarette smoking. Although smoking has
become less common in the U.S. generally (25% smoke), some
groups, such as those with low incomes (Bergen & Caporaso,
1999) and African Americans living in inner city neighbor-
hoods, smoke at almost double the general rate (45% smoke),
with rates higher for women (Ahluwalia, Harris, Catley,
Okuyemi, & Mayo, 2002). Moreover, among urban African
Americans, a particular type and pattern of smoking is prevalent
—these smokers are more likely to choose menthol cigarettes
and to smoke within 10 min of waking up (Ahluwalia et al.,
2002; Royce, Hymowitz, Corbett, Hartwel1, & Orlandi, 1993).
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in beliefs about the identity-congruence of smoking. African
Americans describe smoking cigarettes as in-group congruent
behavior (Oyserman et al., 2007). This does not mean
that smoking is viewed positively, rather that it is recognized
as an in-group thing to do. Independent samples suggest
that African Americans do rate smoking as a community
problem and also that they report trouble quitting, even
though attempts at quitting are common (Ahluwalia et al.,
2002; Royce et al., 1993). Eye-tracking research suggests
that once smoking is identity-based, warnings are not perused
(Fox et al., 1998).
Negative consequences of identity-based consumption
choices are not confined to low income or minority groups.
More privileged groups are also likely to make consumption
choices that are identity-based, sometimes with unintended
negative consequences. For example, for many undergraduates,
being a college student includes engaging in a set of behaviors
(e.g., late nights, junk food, excessive alcohol, tobacco or
marijuana use) that together result in unintended poor health
outcomes such as weight gain, depression and accident risk
(Werch, Moore, Bian, DiClemente, Ames, Weiler, Thombs,
Pokorny, & Huang 2008). Weight gain in the first year of
college is so common that it has a name, “the freshman fifteen.”
Gaining weight is not viewed positively, but it is identity-
syntonic among individuals for whom being a college student is
an important social identity.
Using an identity-based motivation perspective suggests that
identity-based motivation influences a variety of consumption
choices which express identity—from mundane meal choices,
to bigger purchases (whether the to buy the house in the suburbs
or keep on renting in town), as well as lifestyle choices that may
improve or undermine health and well-being. While seemingly
innocuous, over time, these behaviors may be well-being
enhancing or impairing.
Lack of attention to identity-based motivation may explain
why traditional exercise and abstinence regimes are unattractive
even though health risk behaviors are common and people are
aware that lifestyle choices matter (Fine, Philogene, Gramling,
Coups, & Sinha 2004). Indeed, health researchers argue that
linking identities to health behaviors is important in the
development and maintenance of health behaviors (Amos et
al., 1997, 1998; Gray, Amos, and Currie, 1997). Choosing
healthy behaviors is more likely if it feels congruent with
important current or possible future self images. People
consciously or nonconsciously compare their current and future
self with their image of the prototypical person who engages in
targeted healthy or risky health behaviors, engaging in
behaviors that fit their identity and not in those that do not
(Gibbons & Gerrard, 1995, 1997; Gibbons, Gerrard, Blanton, &
Russell, 1998).
Final comments
In this paper, I outlined a perspective that assigns a central
role to identity as it is dynamically constructed in context.
Briefly, while identity feels stable and important, it is alsohighly malleable and context sensitive, even though people are
unlikely to be aware of the impact of situations on behaviors
that they attribute to identity, or of the influence of identity on
other cognitions and behaviors. Identity matters because it
influences what actions people take (action-readiness) and how
they make sense of the world (procedural-readiness). Identity-
based motivation can be beneficial or detrimental, depending on
how the identity is constructed in the specific context and the
behavioral and procedural options available in that context. It is
not possible to understand the influence of identity on cognition
and behavior without taking situations into account. Identity-
based readiness should influence consumer behavior depending
on features of the situation in which choices are made. These
include advertisements, who is identified with a brand or
product, and whether information is best understood using
identity-congruent or -incongruent procedures.References
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